Abstract: Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision. They can also be a driving force for more serious conflicts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, however, the emergence of social tensions has only rarely been studied in the literature. In the present contribution a game-theoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In particular, the respective effects of fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation are assessed. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical evidence on ethnic conflicts. The framework can also be applied to the study of social capital and merger failures. Abstract Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision. They can also be a driving force for more serious con ‡icts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, however, the emergence of social tensions has only rarely been studied in the literature. In the present contribution a gametheoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In particular, the respective e¤ects of fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation are assessed. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical evidence on ethnic con ‡icts. The framework can also be applied to the study of social capital and merger failures.
Introduction
Social tensions are important for several reasons. They have a direct impact on social welfare by threatening social cohesion and by impeding collective goods provision and economic performance. Their indirect impact, however, is even more worrisome. Social tensions are, together with the feasibility of collective action, a necessary condition for the break out of more serious forms of con ‡ict, such as civil wars (cf., Collier and Hoe-er, 2004; , for a related discussion).
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1 Surprisingly, the emergence of social tensions has only received very little attention in the literature. In the present contribution I would like to address this gap and show with the help of a game-theoretic model how information, reputation e¤ects and the group structure of a society can favour or hinder the emergence of social tensions. The source of tensions in our framework will be disputed economic relations and the impact of fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation on the reputation cost of defection will be examined.
These concepts are de…ned in the following way. A highly fractionalised society is de…ned as one with a great number of divisions and of distinct groups. Following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, p.797), a highly polarised society is de…ned as a society "where a large minority group faces a majority group". Polarisation is greatest if a society consists of two groups of equal size, and is smallest if a society consists of one homogenous group. Segregation is de…ned as the extent to which di¤erent groups in the society are kept separate. More formal de…nitions of these concepts are included in the sections four and …ve.
Our model of social tensions is ‡exible enough to capture di¤erent forms of social tensions for which reputation and group structure play important roles. One natural and particularly important application of the model is ethnic con‡ict, as the structure of social tension is the driving force behind this form of con ‡ict. The predictions of the model about the emergence of social tensions and grievances is complementary to the existing (formal) literature on ethnic con ‡ict that focuses on collective action issues and the supply of hate-inducing actions by politicians (see for example, Glaeser, 2005; Esteban and Ray, 2006a; Caselli and Coleman, 2006) . The model can also contribute to the literature on social capital and merger failures.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will be devoted to a discussion of the related literature and applications of the model, while in section 3 a basic model of peaceful versus con ‡icting economic interactions is built for a homogenous society. In section 4, group structure will be introduced in the model, and the impact of polarisation and segregation will be assessed. The model will be extended to n-groups in section 5 and the e¤ects of fractionalisation will be studied. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature and Applications
First, we shall discuss the literature that is related to the building blocks of the model, then the focus will lie on applications of the model, i.e. ethnic con ‡ict, social capital and merger failures. The modelling framework of the present contribution builds up on the literature on commitment, reputation and contract enforcement in trade and business (see Greif, 1993; Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994; Tirole, 1996; Dixit, 2003) 1 .
The literature on trade and con ‡ict is also relevant for the present paper, which derives conditions under which peaceful trade (i.e. cooperation) prevails over appropriative activities (i.e. defection). In political science there is a large empirical literature on the "liberal peace" (see Polachek, 1980; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001) 2 . More recently, economists have shown interest in the interaction between trade and con ‡ict, concluding that the overall impact of trade is ambiguous and depends on the price e¤ects (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001 ) and the bilateral versus multilateral nature of trade (Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, 2006) .
We shall now discuss three applications of the model.
Ethnic Con ‡ict
Often civil wars occur along ethnic lines. In countries as diverse as Rwanda, Sudan, Guatemala or Angola, ethnicity has played a major role in the breakout of hostilities.
There is a growing literature about ethnicity and civil wars. The empirical evidence is not conclusive so far. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe-er (2004) …nd that ethnic fractionalisation does not increase the risk of civil war outbreaks. By contrast, Vanhanen (1999) , Sambanis (2001) and Collier, Hoe-er and Rohner (2006) conclude, using other data sources and measures, that ethnic fractionalisation increases the risk of civil wars. 3 Cederman and Girardin (2007) and Bates (1999) explain the occurrence of con ‡ict with ethnonationalist exclusiveness, respectively one group's fear of permanent political exclusion.
Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) …nd that what drives ethnic con ‡ict is not fractionalisation, but polarisation.
Ethnic segregation has also received considerable attention in the literature. Some scholars have claimed that segregation increases the risk of ethnic con ‡ict (Diez Medrano, 1994; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996) , while others have argued that segregation, taking the form of "partition", could be a solution to ethnic con ‡ict (Horowitz, 1985) 4 . Given the inconclusiveness of the empirical literature, it seems important to show theoretically through which channels ethnic cleavages could matter. Surprisingly, however, theoretical studies building formal models of ethnicity and con ‡ict have been scarce. Esteban and Ray (1999) develop a behavioral model of contest and bargaining between groups according to the distribution of certain 2 Most contributions in this literature …nd that trade relationships between countries can reduce the scope of inter-state war by increasing the long-run gains from economic cooperation. 3 A nonlinear impact of ethnicity on con ‡ict could explain the contradictory …ndings of the empirical literature. Horowitz (1985) has performed a comparative analysis and has found that for fully homogenous and for fully heterogenous societies the risk of ethnic con ‡ict is small, whereas the risk is greater for fewer big groups confronting each other. Using crosscountry evidence, Collier and Hoe-er (1998) have come to a similar conclusion, namely that intermediate levels of fractionalisation are the most risky.
characteristics. In more recent papers (2006a; 2006b), the same authors focus on ethnic mobilisation and rent-seeking and on the question why in a society with class and ethnic cleavages, the latter tend to be more salient than the former 5 . Also Robinson (2001) enquires under what conditions ethnic con ‡ict is more or less salient and destructive than class con ‡ict. Another formal model addressing ethnic con ‡ict has been built by Caselli and Coleman II (2006) . They study the interaction between coalitions of di¤erent groups, whereas ethnicity increases the risk of con ‡ict by enforcing coalition membership. Fearon and Laitin (1996) emphasise intra-group enforcement of group members'cooperation with players from other ethnic groups. It is shown that policing inside a group can ensure peaceful relations outside the group. 6 All these papers focus on aggregate players ("interest groups") rather than on individual players, and do not treat the respective e¤ects of ethnic polarisation, fractionalisation and segregation.
The present contribution would like to address the shortcomings of the existing literature on ethnic con ‡ict by building a theoretical model in which the group structure of a society matters through the channels of information and reputation, and that is able to assess the impact of ethnic polarisation, segregation and fractionalisation on the likelihood of social tensions between ethnic groups. Rather than focusing on coalition building and contests between aggregate groups, as has been done in previous studies, I will emphasise the social tensions on the level of individual players.
The Emergence of Social Capital
In recent years scholars in economics have developed a strong interest in the impact of social aspects of society on economic performance. These underlying characteristics of a society have often been referred to as "social capital". There is some ambiguity about what is actually meant by "social capital" (cf. Dasgupta, 2005) , but most studies link it to trust, civic participation and social networks. These aspects have been shown to have an important positive impact on economic and social outcomes (Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Temple and Johnson, 1998; Francois and Zabojnik, 2005) .
Knowing that social capital matters, scholars have started to empirically study the factors that can favour or hinder its emergence. A key …nding is that racial and ethnic cleavages and heterogeneity can result in several (generally) undesirable social and civic outcomes associated with more social tensions and disputes and lower levels of social capital. In particular, a more fractionalised and polarised group structure has been shown to result in less civic participation La Ferrara, 2000, Vigdor, 2004) , less trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 5 In another interesting paper Esteban and Ray (2006c) treat the contrasting e¤ects of fractionalisation and polarisation on con ‡ict onsets and intensity. They do not include ethnicity and reputation concerns in their model. Rather, fractionalisation, polarisation, as well as political institutions matter by a¤ecting the cost of con ‡ict for di¤erent groups in a collective action framework. 6 The creation and impact of ethnic identities is another important topic in the literature about ethnic con ‡ict (Basu, 2005; Sen, 2006 The present contribution will explain theoretically how group cleavages, i.e. fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation, favour or hinder the emergence of social tensions, which can to many respects be regarded as the opposite force to social cohesion and social capital, decreasing trust and civic collaboration. Thus, our theory of social tensions hopes to contribute to the study of forces impeding the building of social capital.
Merger failures
Social tensions among employees have been shown to result in a suboptimal performance of companies (Rob and Zemsky, 2002) . This is especially relevant for mergers, as in many mergers of companies the post-merger pro…tability is lower than before. This at …rst sight surprising outcome can be explained by "cultural con ‡ict" between employees of the companies merged (Weber and Camerer, 2003) . Fulghieri and Hodrick (2006) and Banal-Estanol, Macho-Stadler and Seldeslachts (2006) have modeled internal con ‡ict after mergers, but do not take reputation and group size e¤ects into account.
The predictions of our model of social tensions are able to account for interesting …ndings of this literature on "merger failures". For example, the result (derived in proposition 4) that maximum polarisation increases the scope for social tensions is consistent with the …nding that "mergers of equals" of two similar sized companies seem to be especially problematic 7 .
The Basic Model
In what follows I build a model of how reputation and information matter for determining whether the economic interaction between players is characterised by "defection" or "cooperation" 8 . The concepts of "defection" and "social tension" are linked in the following way.
De…nition 1 Social tension
"number of matches with defection" divided by "total number of matches".
The more players defect, the higher is the level of social tensions.
Strategies, Payo¤s, Information
The following assumptions are made: 7 Cf. Weber and Camerer (2003) for a discussion of the (largely unsuccessful) merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler. Agrawal, Ja¤e and Mandelker (1992) provide empirical evidence that …rms do on average especially poorly when acquiring "preys" that are large relative to themselves (although the relationship is non-monotonic). 8 These concepts are more formally de…ned under assumption G.2 below.
G.1 -General setting:
The game lasts for an in…nite number of periods. Players discount the future and take into account that, with some probability, they will "die" in a given future period. The players who die are replaced by newly born players. There is a large number of players who match randomly.
G.2 -Actions: First, players choose between entering into contact with the opponent or staying out. If players enter, they select the level of the variable F (referring to "…ghting e¤ort"), where F 2 [0; 1]. Although we allow for intermediate levels of F, it follows from the speci…cation of the payo¤ function (as shown below) that the variable F always takes the extreme values 0 (which we call "cooperation") or 1 (which we call "defection").
G.3 -Payo¤ function: In all periods all players receive a payo¤ of 0 if they stay out. If they enter into contact with their match, they have the payo¤ function displayed in equation (1) 9 .
where i,j=players, =parameter capturing the decisiveness of …ghting e¤ort (with 0 0:5), =parameter indicating the …ghting technology (ability) of player i (0 1), F =level of …ghting e¤ort (0 F 1), =…ghting technology of player j (0 1), S=economic gains (surplus) from interaction, c=parameter related to the cost of player i's …ghting e¤ort, and g=parameter measuring player i's cost in ‡icted by the …ghting e¤ort of player j.
The total economic gains of the interaction S are multiplied by the linear di¤erence-form contest success function 10 , (
, which refers to the share that player i receives of the gains. The relative share of player i depends linearly on the di¤erences in …ghting e¤ort between the players. The shares of both players sum up to 1.
The parameter measures the decisiveness of the di¤erences in the …ghting e¤ort between the two players. If = 0, both opponents receive half of the surplus S, independently of their …ghting e¤ort. By contrast, if = 1, the level of …ghting has a strong impact on the distribution of S. Further, the parameters and re ‡ect the …ghting technology of the two players. = 0 indicates a total ine¢ cient …ghting technology of player i, where an increased …ghting e¤ort of i does not result in his obtaining a greater share. = 1 corresponds to a very e¢ cient …ghting technology of i. It is analogous for player j's …ghting technology . Player i's payo¤ function (1) also includes the parameters c and g which relate to the cost of his own …ghting e¤ort, respectively the destruction in ‡icted by the opponent's …ghting e¤ort. 9 The payo¤ function of player j is analogous: V j = ( 1 2 + ( F j F i ))S cF j gF i : 1 0 "Contest success functions" relate …ghting e¤orts to the share of a "prize" received by a particular player (see Hirshleifer, 1989; Skaperdas, 1996) . The present contest success function, (
; is similar to the one used in Rohner (2006) , although the present contribution introduces the …ghting technology di¤erently.
G.4 -Types:
There are two types of players who di¤er in their …ghting ability . The players referred to as "strong" ("weak") have = ( = ), where > . A proportion p of the population are assumed to be "strong" types.
G.5 -Information: i) The players are incompletely informed about the type of the other players. All other features of the game such as the form of the payo¤ function, the strategy space and the distribution of the two types are common knowledge.
ii) In general, players only observe the actions played in the interactions in which they are involved. However, it is assumed that, if a player defects and his opponent cooperates, a proportion q of the players becomes informed about the defection. One could think, for example, of a player telling his friends about the bad behaviour of his last opponent. If both players defect, they do not inform their friends about the interaction. The intuitive reason is that they do not want to appear in a bad light, as they have defected themselves as well.
iii) The players are assumed to have imperfect recall. The players who learn in a given period about the defection of another player will remember the fact that this player has defected in the past, without however remembering in which period(s) it happened 11 . Also, players do not remember any other aspects of past interactions.
G.6 -Solution concept: The equilibrium concept used is the "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium".
The equilibria of the stage game
First, I derive results that are valid for the stage game in any period, then I focus on the reputation cost of defection, which is related to the "shadow of the future". Thus, for the moment we can think of the game as a one-shot game. It is analysed under what conditions players will enter into contact with their match, and whether they choose cooperation or defection.
When players decide to enter the game, they choose defection (
12 . This cut-o¤ level is crucial for the equilibrium of the game.
Further, players only decide to enter the game if the expected payo¤ V i (given the optimal levels of F i and F j chosen thereafter) is greater than their outside option of staying out, which equals 0.
If both types have high …ghting abilities, i.e. > and > , both will …ght if they choose to enter. Equation (2) displays the condition under which players of a given type choose to enter. They enter if the expected payo¤ of entering is greater than or equal to zero 13 .
where e p = t S p t S p+t W (1 p) ; p=proportion of the population being "strong" types, t S =proportion of "strong" types entering, t W =proportion of "weak" types entering.
The parameter e p refers to the proportion of the entering players that are of a "strong" type. According to the values of the di¤erent parameters there are three possible outcomes: both types stay out, "strong" types enter and defect and "weak" types stay out or both types choose to enter and defect. For some ranges of values multiple equilibria arise. As the focus of the present contribution is the reputation e¤ect of group cleavages, which is only relevant to the case of > > treated further below, we will not go into more detail for the case of > ; > .
If both types have not very e¤ective …ghting technologies, < , < , they will both choose full economic cooperation, where F i = 0. For both players cooperating, F i = F j = 0, the payo¤ of entering the game is always positive. Thus, for ine¤ective …ghting technologies in equilibrium all players choose the actions (enter, cooperate) in all periods.
The case which is most interesting and relevant to our research question is when > > . From now on we will focus on this case. For > > , "strong" types would in a one-shot game, if they enter, always choose defection (F i = 1), and "weak" types would, if they do not stay out, always choose to cooperate (F i = 0). As before, di¤erent cases can be distinguished according to the decision of the two types to enter or stay out. "Strong" types enter the interaction if condition (3) holds:
Please note that, for assuring correct and consistent beliefs, "strong" types must have the beliefs of all "strong" types entering if condition (3) holds. Thus, this implies that t S =1 and condition (3) becomes: (
where
. "Weak" types enter the interaction if condition (4) holds:
Given that > = c S ; "strong" types have always greater incentives to enter the interaction than "weak" types. Put di¤erently, equation (3) always holds if equation (4) holds.
To make the analysis interesting, we can assume that condition (3) always holds, for all levels of e p. This is assured by assumption G.7 below. G.7 -Condition assuring that strong types always enter: It is assumed that S 2 c g 0.
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It follows that "strong" types always enter, and "weak" types only enter the interaction with a given opponent if the probability e p of the opponent being "strong" is smaller than some threshold level e p . Formally, condition (4) can be rewritten as:
Again, for making the analysis interesting, we assume that the proportion p of "strong" types is relatively small and that condition (5) holds if all "weak" players enter the game (t W = 1). It is also assumed that 0 < e p < 1. Accordingly, if condition (5) holds and if a "weak" type matches with some trader of whom she has not had any a priori information, she will enter the interaction and then choose to trade (F i = 0). Please note that there is also another equilibrium where all "weak" players stay out, even though entering would be pro…table if all "weak" types were to enter, and where accordingly e p = 1. For the rest of the analysis we will focus on the most interesting case where the conditions (3) and (5) hold, and where without a priori information "weak" players enter the game.
As shown in the next subsection, if a player has learnt that her present opponent has defected in the past, she can deduce (using Bayesian updating) that her opponent is with probability e p=1 a "strong" type and that therefore condition (5) does not hold. Thus, she will not enter the interaction.
The reputation cost of defection
So far, the stage game has been analysed. Now, inter-temporal considerations are included. As players both discount future bene…ts and take into account the possibility of dying in future periods, we multiply future bene…ts with multiples of the parameter = 0 h, where 0 =discount factor (0< 0 <1) and h=probability of being still alive in a given period (0<h<1).
First of all, we have to state the in…nite periods equivalent of equations (3) to (5), in order to know the conditions under which "strong" and "weak" types enter the game if they have not received any information about the past behaviour of the opponent (in the case of receiving information about a past defection their belief structure is di¤erent, as we will see at a later stage). Taking into account the probabilities of opponents being of a "strong" type, and of them defecting 14 , conditional on having received no information, the equations (4) and (5) become, respectively, (4') and (5'). Assumption G.7, i.e. S 2 c g 0, still assures that defecting "strong" types always enter. Equation (4') now refers to the entering condition for a cooperating "strong" type or a "weak" type. It translates in equation (5'), as before.
where b p=probability of the opponent being a "strong" type conditional on receiving no information about past defections, b z=probability of the opponent defecting conditional on having not being informed about past defections.
We will focus on the case where the condition (5') holds and where accordingly all "weak" players enter the game if they have no (negative) a priori information about their match. As before, we assume that 0 < b p < 1. The optimal strategy of the "weak" types, and the optimal strategy of "strong" types who get informed about the opponent's past defection are treated in proposition 1. Below, we will derive the optimal strategy of "strong types" when they receive no information about the past behaviour of their opponent.
There is a reputation cost for "strong" types choosing defection in the …rst period, as informed "weak" players will not enter in economic interaction with them. If this reputation cost is big enough, "strong" players will in the …rst period choose cooperation (F i = 0) rather than defection in order to avoid the reputation cost.
The condition under which "strong" players choose cooperation rather than defection in the …rst period can be obtained by comparing the expected values of cooperation and defection. Usually such a problem would be very complex as one would have to consider an in…nite number of strategies. Fortunately, the structure of the reputation cost of defection implies that "strong" types have only two potential strategies which are a best-reply for some parameter values: First, defection in the …rst period and always thereafter. Second, cooperation in all periods. In what follows it is shown that these two strategies are Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for some parameter values. The preliminary results needed are derived in the lemmas 1 and 2.
As outlined earlier in the assumptions G.1 and G.5, at the beginning of each period a proportion of players die (some of which are informed about past defections), and then further people become informed about the defection in the past period. People who are informed, stay informed until their death. Allowing for some probability of "forgetting" would not a¤ect our results.
To show that "always defect" can be an equilibrium strategy for "strong" types for some parameter values, we have to show that "strong" types who …nd it in their interest to defect in some period (if the reputation cost of defection is not big enough) will only continue to choose defection if the reputation cost of doing so is non-increasing, which is the case in our framework. The intuition of the proof is as follows:
A player will only defect in a given period if the initial gain of defection is greater than the loss due to the additional number of players informed about the defection. At the beginning of the …rst period in which defection is chosen by a given player, nobody is informed about a past defection, as there was no past defection. As always, a part q of the "weak" non-informed players get informed 15 . After a second defection a proportion q of the non-informed "weak" players would become informed. As there are now less non-informed players (as some of the informed players of the previous period survive), the additional reputation cost of defection in this second defection period would be smaller and so forth. Thus, once the player has defected, the reputation costs of future defections is ever decreasing.
Also, until the …rst defection the incentive structure of a given player is stationary. Thus, if he …nds it in his interest to defect in a given period , he would already have incentives to start defecting at any period t < . It follows that he will start defection in the …rst period.
The reasoning above is summarised in lemma 1.
Lemma 1 A player who ever chooses to defect will start to do so in the …rst period, and will stick to defection in all future periods.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
The reasoning for the case of players choosing in all periods to cooperate, treated in lemma 2, is similar to the reasoning applied for lemma 1. As long as a player never chooses defection, his incentive structure is the same for all periods and, if he has no incentives to choose defection in a given period , he will not …nd it in his interest to do so in any period t 6 = .
Lemma 2 A player who …nds it in her interest to cooperate in a given period, will also choose cooperation in all previous and future periods.
Following the results of lemmas 1 and 2, and assuming that the equation (4') holds, we can derive for "strong" types the conditions under which the equilibria "always cooperate" or "always defect" are selected when receiving a signal "N" (no information about the opponent's past behaviour is revealed).
From our assumption G.7, i.e.
S 2 c g > 0, follows that "strong" players will choose (enter, defection) whenever they observe a signal "I" (information that the opponent has defected in the past), as defecting on another defector will not result in a reputation cost (cf. assumption G.5).
Equation (6) represents the inter-temporal expected value for a given player i, who is of a "strong" type, to choose defection in the …rst period and always thereafter. This expected value computation takes into account that in equilibrium opponents who have defected in the past after observing "N" will defect again, and that "weak" players who get informed in the future about player i's defection will stay out, while informed "strong" opponents will defect.
where b q=expected probability of receiving a signal "I" (information that the present opponent has defected in the past), b z=expected proportion of potential "strong" type opponents who defect conditional on a signal of "N" (no information about the opponent's past behaviour is revealed), b p=expected proportion of opponents being of a "strong" type conditional on having received a signal "N", e q=present value of the proportion of players who are informed in the di¤erent future periods about player i having defected. Equation (7) reports the expected value for "strong" types of choosing cooperation in all periods when receiving a signal "N", and choosing defection when receiving a signal "I".
The expected value of cooperation is greater if the proportion of players who are informed about the previous periods'defection(s) is big enough. "Strong" types will choose cooperation rather than defection if condition (8) holds 16 17 .
Please note that the variable e q is strictly increasing in q (this can be seen from the equations used in the proof of lemma 1). This permits us to focus in the following analysis on q (the cut-o¤ level of q corresponding to e q can be denoted as q*).
The equilibrium of the game is summarised in proposition 1. The beliefs about the opponent are denoted by , where =expected probability that the opponent is a "strong" type. The …rst case is if equation (8) does not hold, i.e. if e q is small (low reputation cost of defection). "Strong" types always choose (enter, defect; = 1) for a signal "I" and (enter, defect; = b p) for a signal "N". "Weak" types play (out; = 1) if they observe a signal "I", and play (enter, cooperate; = b p) if they observe "N".
The second case is if equation (8) holds, i.e. if e q is big (high reputation cost of defection). "Strong" types play (enter, defect; = 1) for a signal "I" and (enter, cooperate; = b p) for a signal "N", "weak" types play (out; = 1) after observing "I" and (enter, cooperate; = b p) after "N". This is the unique equilibrium for the "weak types" entering the game.
There are also two equilibria where the "weak" types do not enter the game. They are treated in the proof of proposition 1. For the analysis of group con ‡ict in the next sections, only the case referred to in proposition 1 is relevant.
In the next section it will be assessed how group cleavages a¤ect the (stage game) "reputation cost" of defection, q, and in this way in ‡uence the scope of cooperation and defection.
Introducing Group Cleavages in the Model
So far, the variable q has been regarded as exogenous. At present, q will become endogenous to the model and it will be discussed how the group structure a¤ects the level of q 18 . In a homogenous society with only one group, the probability of the next match of a player being informed about his past defection corresponds simply to the number of uninformed players ("friends") who become informed by each player who has been betrayed in the previous period, divided by the total number of players in the population. Thus, q = k, where k=part of uninformed players who become informed about the defection.
Introducing group cleavages in the model leads to additional assumptions and features of the game. These are listed below.
G.8 -Two groups: Initially, we assume that the population is composed of two groups, which for example di¤er in ethnic characteristics (in section 5 the model will be extended to n-groups). The …rst group amounts to a share w of the whole population (0 w 1). Accordingly, the part v=(1-w) of the population belongs to the second group. G.9 -Part time d: Players spend a certain part d (whereas 0<d<1) of their total time endowment (which is normalized to 1) for within-group activities. For expositional ease, it is assumed in the main text that this part d is …xed and does not depend on the relative group sizes. The results are all robust for a more general framework, with the part of time spent on intra-group interactions depending on the relative group sizes. This is derived in Appendix B.
The model presented allows for di¤erent levels of d for di¤erent groups, and this general case will also be emphasised for the analysis of intra-group con ‡ict. For inter-group interaction, however, we will assume without loss of generality that all groups have the same level of d, which eases the exposition.
The part d could for example be interpreted as the time spent on tribal gatherings or religious ceremonies and on other intra-group interaction. Similarly, the fraction of time (1-d) is spent with people from the other group. Typically, people from both groups are assumed to spend more than the proportional share of their time on intra-group activities. This can be expressed as
G.10 -Matching: For some values of d and w, not all players will …nd a trade partner. In this case they are assumed to be outside the game for one period and to get some compensation (for example through an insurance scheme), leaving their expected inter-temporal payo¤ unchanged.
The Likelihood of Intra-Group and Inter-Group Tension
The probability of the next period's match being informed about the present defection in the case of interaction with a member of the same group i is given by q S below (computation in Appendix A) 19 .
where, k=part of uninformed players who become informed about the defection ("friends"), w=relative size of the own group i relative to the whole population (0 w 1), d i =the part of the time a given player spends with people from her own group i (0 d i 1).
If a player defects on an opponent from another group, the probability q D of the next period's match being informed becomes as displayed below (computation in Appendix A). As mentioned earlier, we assume for convenience that 1 9 The expression is analogous for the other group j. 2 0 Please note that the level of inter-group defection is the same for both groups, independently of the parameter values. Knowing that w+v=1, we can easily see from equation (10) 
Group cleavages a¤ect at the same time the unconditional probability of meeting people and the conditional probability of their being informed. The interaction of changes in these two values leads to non-linear e¤ects of introducing group cleavages on the likelihood of the next match being informed. In some cases, group division can lead to increased social tensions due to a lower reputation cost of defection. In other cases, the likelihood of social tensions can be reduced. We shall now compare the scope for social tensions within groups, between groups and in homogenous societies.
Proposition 2
The likelihood of intra-group tension initiated by a member of a group i in heterogenous societies is lower than the likelihood of inter-group tension for the usual assumption that the time spent for intra-group interaction is greater than group i's proportional share in the population (d > w), resp.
The likelihood of intra-group tension initiated by a member of a group i in heterogenous societies is always lower than the likelihood of tension in a homogenous society without cleavages, given the usual assumptions.
The likelihood of inter-group tension initiated by a member of group i in heterogenous societies is higher than the likelihood of tension in a homogenous society without cleavages, given the usual assumption (d > w), resp. (d > 1 w).
The intuition behind these results is that a high likelihood of future interaction with informed players makes intra-group defection especially costly. Given that this likelihood is lower for inter-group interaction, the reputation cost of defection is lower for that case; it is intermediate for homogenous societies.
The Impact of Polarisation
An important issue is how increases or decreases in polarisation a¤ect the likelihood of intra-group and inter-group tension. In the present paper I focus on the case of polarisation between two groups, which is de…ned in the following way.
De…nition 2 Polarisation 1 jw vj, where w=population share of group i, v=population share of group j.
The more similar the shares of the two population groups, the higher is the level of polarisation in a given society. This way of introducing polarisation in our theoretical framework is consistent with the commonly used de…nitions and measures of polarisation (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005 ).
The impact of changes in the population share of a group on its likelihood of intra-group defection and tension is given by the …rst derivative of q S with respect w, as displayed in equation (11):
This expression is negative ( @q S @w < 0), for the usual assumption d i > w, i.e. when people spend more than the proportional share of their time on intragroup interaction. This implies that increases in the size of his own group w (for a given level of group integration d) lead to more defection and thus a higher likelihood of intra-group tension for group i. An increase in w would however correspond to a decrease in v (as v=1-w), lowering the likelihood of intra-group tension for the second group j.
The impact of changes in w on the likelihood of inter-group tension is given by expression (12) .
The expression @q D @w becomes positive for w>0.5. We shall now analyse what happens if initially polarisation is at a minimum (w=1, v=0) and increases afterwards, i.e. w decreases and v increases. The e¤ects on intra-group defection for the more numerous group (here group i) and the less numerous group are summarised in proposition 3:
Proposition 3 A marginal increase in polarisation (decreasing the population share of the more numerous group and increasing the share of the less numerous group for a given level of d i ) results in a lower level of intra-group tension inside the more numerous group and in a higher level of intra-group tension inside the smaller group.
Proof. For d i > w, in equation (10) we have @q S @w < 0. Thus, increasing (decreasing) w results in a lower (higher) q S , and therefore a higher (lower) likelihood of defection and social tension.
Intuitively, for the more numerous group, a decrease in its size increases the likelihood that fellow group members will become informed (i.e. w increases in equation (9)) and thus increases the reputation cost of defection. The e¤ect goes in the opposite direction for an increase in the group size of the less numerous group.
However, in most countries that su¤er from political instability and from social tensions, the constraint that is binding is the condition for inter-group tension (given that q D < q S , as derived in proposition 2). It is summarised in proposition 4 how an increase in polarisation matters with that respect.
Proposition 4 A marginal increase in polarisation results in a lower reputation cost of defection q D (for both groups) and accordingly in a higher level of intergroup tension. The intuition for this result is as follows. As shown in the Appendix A (see equation A.7), the reputation cost q D is composed of two terms, the probability of players from the own group being informed and the probability of players from the other group being informed. If the groups become very unequal in size, one of these two terms will sharply increase, given that the relative group sizes are in the denominator of these terms. This results in a large q D . For high levels of polarisation, both terms remain moderate in size, and q D stays low.
The present framework provides a theoretical explanation as to why high levels of polarisation can result in social tensions between ethnic groups. If collective action is feasible, this increase in social tensions can lead to ethnic civil wars. It has been found in the empirical literature (for example, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) that polarisation increases the risk of civil wars, but theoretical models focusing on this issue have so far been sparse. Figure 1 plots as a numerical example 21 the levels of q S and q D for di¤erent levels of w. The values of q D are lower than the values of q S , indicating that the likelihood of inter-group tension is higher than of intra-group tension. The parameter q D takes its lowest value at w=0.5 (maximum polarisation). It follows that the more polarised a society, the greater is the likelihood of inter-group tension.
The Impact of Segregation
The concept of segregation refers to the separation and lack of interaction between di¤erent groups. 22 The extent of segregation is measured in our model by the parameter d. The following de…nition applies: Remember that we had de…ned social tension as the proportions of interactions that were con ‡icted, i.e. where defection occurred. This concept has so far been appropriate, as until now d was constant. For the analysis of segregation, however, d is not constant. Thus, we shall de…ne a further concept that not only captures the likelihood of defection per interaction but also the number of interactions.
De…nition 4 Social disputes total number of defections.
Please note that "social disputes" (total number of defections) = (social tensions) (number of interactions). We shall …rst establish the impact of changes in the relevant parameter (which is d at present) on the likelihood of intra-group tension. Equation (13) displays the …rst derivative of q S with respect to d i .
We have @q S @di > 0 for the usual assumption d i > w. Increases in d i result in increases in q S , and thus lead to reduced scope for intra-group tension. However, the impact of segregation on the total number of disputes is ambiguous. Although tensions are reduced, intra-group interaction becomes more frequent. The proposition below summarises this trade-o¤: Proposition 5 More segregation (i.e., a higher d i ) increases q S and thereby results in less intra-group tension. If the increase in q S is substantial, it can lead to initially con ‡icted interactions (q S < q ) becoming peaceful (q S q ), thereby reducing total intra-group disputes. In contrast, for smaller increases in q S , segregation can result in a higher level of total social disputes by making intra-group interaction more frequent.
Proof. From equation (13) follows
This result is intuitive, as more intra-group interaction increases the monitoring of intra-group defection, reducing in this way social tensions. Now we shall analyse the e¤ects of segregation on inter-group interactions.
It follows from equation (14) that d > 0:5 , @q D @d < 0. As discussed earlier, the assumption G.9 that d>w, d>(1-w) implies that d>0,5, as max [w; 1 w] > 0:5: Thus, segregation leads, as players from di¤erent groups meet less often, to a lower reputation cost of defection q D , and to more social tension. At the same time, segregation reduces inter-group interaction, making the overall e¤ect on inter-group disputes ambiguous.
Proposition 6 Segregation increases inter-group tensions. The impact on intergroup disputes is ambiguous. Full segregation (d=1) eliminates inter-group disputes entirely. For intermediate levels of segregation (0<d<1), and initially con ‡icted inter-group interactions (q D < q ), segregation reduces the occurrence of inter-group disputes by decreasing inter-group interaction (as already q D < q , a further decrease in q D does not matter). For initially honest and peaceful inter-group interaction (q D q ), segregation can increase the scope for inter-group disputes, if the decrease in q D is large enough such that afterwards q D < q holds.
Proof. Follows from the reasoning discussed above.
Social Tension in an n-group Framework
For analysing issues like polarisation it made sense to limit ourselves to a 2-group framework that allowed for an unequal size of the groups. However, for analysing fractionalisation, as well as for testing the robustness of previous results, it is helpful to use a n-group framework, with more than two groups, each of an equal size. Fractionalisation is de…ned as below:
r , where r=number of groups.
The level of fractionalisation increases in the number of groups in the society. For intra-group defection in a n-group setting, the likelihood q S of the next period's opponent being informed is given by equation (15) , which corresponds to q S in the 2-group framework with w = 1 r , where r is the number of groups.
The main di¤erence between the n-group and the 2-group framework is that in the n-group case strangers from other groups do not all belong to the same other group. Thus, if a player from a group i defects on an opponent of a given group j, this will result in a relatively high probability that other players of group j are informed of the defection. However, players from another "foreign" group m will be as badly informed about the defection as the players of the "home" group i. Thus, it is necessary to take into account the probability of matching people from all di¤erent groups as well as their conditional probability of being informed. This is done in Appendix A.
The likelihood of the next period's match being informed about inter-group defection is given by equation (16).
Propositions 5 and 6, summarising the e¤ects of segregation on social tensions and disputes, also hold in a n-group framework if the …rst derivative of q S with respect to d i is positive, and the …rst derivative of q D with respect to d is negative. As q S is the same in the n-group as in the 2-group framework (for w = 1 r ), the results on intra-group interaction of the 2-group setting remain valid for n-groups. As far as inter-group interaction is concerned, the …rst derivative of q D with respect to d is displayed in equation (17) .
We have
Thus, the conclusions of proposition 6 in the previous section hold as well for the n-player framework (given the usual assumption G.9).
For assessing the impact of fractionalisation on social tensions, one can focus on the derivatives Proposition 7 A marginal increase in fractionalisation (i.e., increasing the number of groups, r, in the population) results in a higher level of q S , provided that d > 1 r , and accordingly in a lower level of intra-group tensions.
Proof. See proof of proposition 3.
Intuitively, as groups become smaller, intra-group monitoring increases. For assessing the impact of fractionalisation on inter-group tensions, one can take the derivative of q D with respect to r, displayed below. We obtain
Proof. Follows from the discussion above.
This …nding is intuitive, as the reduced relative size of the opponent's group in a fractionalised society makes it less likely to meet someone of that group in the future, decreasing thereby the reputation cost of defection. Our theoretical result is consistent with recent empirical evidence on fractionalisation increasing social tensions and con ‡icts between ethnic groups (cf., for example, Collier, Hoe-er and Rohner, 2006).
Conclusion
The present contribution has examined how group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In the model players had the choice between staying out, cooperating or defecting. It has been shown how the reputation cost of future opponents being informed about defection can enforce cooperation. This reputation cost depended critically on group structure.
Increases in polarisation have been found to increase intra-group tensions in the less numerous group and decrease tensions inside the more numerous group. It also leads to more social tensions between groups. The impact of increased segregation are less clear-cut, as segregation not only a¤ects the level of social tensions, but also the frequency of interaction. If the e¤ect of segregation on q S is large, it can reduce intra-group disputes, whereas otherwise it can result in a rise of intra-group disputes. Inter-group disputes may be increased by segregation if initially relations are peaceful, while segregation can reduce intergroup disputes if initially interactions are con ‡icted. Fractionalisation has been found to decrease social tensions within groups and increase social tensions between groups.
The …ndings of the model can account for recent empirical evidence on polarisation, fractionalisation and ethnic con ‡ict by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Collier, Hoe-er and Rohner (2006) . The predictions of the theoretical framework can also be applied to the literature on social capital and merger failures.
Further theoretical and empirical research on group structure, group identity and social tensions is encouraged.
Appendix A -Derivations of the mathematical results of the main text
Proof of Lemma 1:
In each period …rst a proportion (1-h) of all players die and are replaced by newly born players, then a proportion q of players become informed if there was a defection in the previous period. Players remain informed until they die.
As for "strong" players, the condition > = c S holds, the initial gain of defection (labelled G ) in a given period equals G = S c > 0, which is the same in all periods.
The present value of the reputation cost L of defecting for the …rst time in a given period equals the sum of all foregone gains in the future due to previously non-informed players getting informed about this particular defection. The exact cost of defection for a player i in a given period t depends on the actions chosen in the future. However, for any given strategy the cost of defection decreases in the number of past defections. Without loss of generality we can focus on the comparison between the reputation cost of defecting in period and defecting in period + 1 (the reasoning is the same for defecting in a period t + 2). It is found that L +1 = L (1 qh) < L , where q>0, h>0. Below, this …nding is illustrated by the derivation of the results for the two stationary cases of "always cooperate" and "always defect".
For the case of always playing (enter, defect) in all future periods t + 1, the loss of defecting in period (the …rst period of defection) equals L = (e q F e q T )y, where
and where e q F = q + q +1 + 2 q +2 + ::: , with q = 0, q +1 = q, q +2 = q +1 h + (1 q +1 h)q = qh+(1 qh)q and so forth, and where e q T = q + q +1 + 2 q +2 + ::: , with q = 0, q +1 = 0, q +2 = q and so forth. e q F (e q T ) refers to the present value of the proportion of players being informed in the future if defection (cooperation) is chosen in period . The term capturing the reputation loss, (e q F 1 e q T 1 ) of defecting for the …rst time in period 1, becomes (e q F e q T ) = q + 2 (1 q)qh + ::: . If a player continues to defect in period + 1 after having defected for the …rst time in period , the immediate gains G of defection remain the same, but the reputation cost is di¤erent. Without loss of generality we can treat the case of a defection in period +1, after having already defected in period . The loss becomes L +1 = (e q F +1 e q T +1 )y, where e q F +1 = q +1 + q +2 + 2 q +3 + ::: , with q +1 = q, q +2 = qh + (1 qh)q and q +3 = (qh + (1 qh)q)h + (1 (qh + (1 qh)q)h)q etc, and e q T +1 = q +1 + q +2 + 2 q +3 + ::: , with q +1 = q, q +2 = qh and q
, and that defecting becomes less and less costly the more a player has defected in the past.
For the case of always playing (enter, cooperate) in all future periods t + 1, the gains of defection are as before, and the reputation cost of defecting in period (the …rst period of defection) equals L = (e q F e q T )y, where e q F = q + q +1 + 2 q +2 + ::: , with q = 0, q +1 = q, q +2 = qh and so forth, and where e q T = 0. It follows that (e q F e q T ) = e q F = q + 2 qh + ::: . If a player defects in period + 1 after having defected for the …rst time in period , and plays (enter, cooperate) in all future periods t + 2, the reputation cost of defection corresponds to L = (e q F +1 e q T +1 )y, where e q F +1 = q +1 + q +2 + 2 q +3 + ::: , with q +1 = q, q +2 = qh + (1 qh)q,
. The results obtained above for the stationary cases of always playing (enter, cooperate) or always playing (enter, defect) in the future also hold for all nonstationary cases (if they were to exist), where players cooperate in some periods and defect in others.
To summarise, once a player chooses to defect in some period , the reputation cost of defection in any future period t > will be smaller than it was in period . It follows that players who defect once will continue to defect in all future periods. Further, up to the period when the …rst defection occurs, the game is stationary and the incentives faced in each period are the same; therefore, if a player has incentives to …rst defect in a period , he would also have had incentives to defect in an earlier period 0 < . Thus, we have = 1, i.e. the player defects in the …rst period.
Proof of Lemma 2:
A player will only choose cooperation in a given period if the present value of choosing "cooperate" is greater than of playing "defect". It is intuitive that if the reputation cost of defection is big enough, "strong" types would choose cooperation. Since in this case the stationary incentive structure would be the same for each period, if they are better o¤ cooperating, it is in their interest to start with cooperation immediately in the …rst period.
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, we can treat all strategies where both players do not condition their actions on the signal observed about the opponent. 1) Both "weak" and "strong" types always selecting (out; 2 [0; 1]) is an equilibrium, as no player would be better o¤ deviating.
2) "Weak" types always choosing (out; 2 [0; 1]) and "strong" types always choosing (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) is not an equilibrium, as "strong" types would deviate and play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]).
3) "Weak" types always choosing (out; 2 [0; 1]) and "strong" types always choosing (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) is an equilibrium, as nobody would deviate.
4) "Weak" types always choosing (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) and "strong" types always choosing (out; 2 [0; 1]) or (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) are not equilibria, as "strong" types would deviate and play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]).
5) "Weak" types always choosing (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) and "strong" types always choosing (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) is not an equilibrium, as "weak" types would deviate and play (out; = 1) if they observe the signal "I". 6) Any cases where "weak" types always choose (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) and "strong" types do not condition their actions on their signals cannot be equilibria, as "weak" types would deviate. Now, at least one type conditions his actions on the signal observed. 7) There can be no cases where "weak" types do not condition their actions on the signal received and "strong" types do, as "strong" types would be better o¤ not conditioning and always playing (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]).
At present, the cases of the "weak" type conditioning, and the "strong" type not conditioning are assessed. 8) Any cases where "strong" types always choose (out; 2 [0; 1]) or (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) and "weak" types condition their actions on their signals cannot be equilibria, as the best reply of the "weak" types would be to always play (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]). 9) When "strong" types always choose (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]), and when "weak" types play (out; = 1) if they observe signal "I", and play (enter, cooperate; = b p) if they observe "N", it is an equilibrium for equation (8) not holding, i.e. if e q is small. In this case nobody has incentives to deviate and the beliefs are consistent. If equation (8) holds, this would not be an equilibrium, as "strong" types would be better o¤ playing (enter, defect; = 1) for a signal "I" and (enter, cooperate; = b p) for a signal "N". 10) "Strong" types always selecting (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) and "weak" types playing (out; 2 [0; 1]) for signal "I", and (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) for "N" is not an equilibrium, as "weak" types would deviate. 11) When "strong" types always choose (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) and "weak" types play (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) if they observe signal "I", and play (out; 2 [0; 1]) if they observe "N", this is not an equilibrium, as "weak" types would deviate.
12) Consider "strong" types always choosing (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) and "weak" types playing (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) if they observe signal "I", and (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) for signal "N". This could not be an equilibrium, as an "innocent" "weak" player i knows that his opponent will always defect, as she will receive a signal "N". The only reason for player i to defect is to be rewarded by a "weak" player choosing (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) in a future interaction. However, as his current match defects with certainty, a defection of player i would not result in anyone being informed. Thus, he is better o¤ choosing (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) or (out; 2 [0; 1]) according to the parameter values for observing "N".
13) Further cases are when "strong" types always choose (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) and "weak" types play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) if they observe signal "I", and play (out; 2 [0; 1]) or (cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) after "N". A signal "I" can only come from a "strong" type who has defected on "weak" types. Thus, "weak" types would deviate, and it is not an equilibrium. Now, both players condition their actions on their signal. 14) Consider "weak" types playing (out; = 1) after observing "I" and (enter, cooperate; = b p) after "N". There is an equilibrium when "strong" types play (enter, defect; = 1) for a signal "I" and (enter, cooperate; = b p) for a signal "N" if equation (8) holds. The beliefs are consistent, and nobody has incentives to deviate. The case of equation (8) not holding is treated under 9). 15) "Weak" types playing (out; 2 [0; 1]) after observing "I" and (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) after "N" is not an equilibrium with conditioning, as the "strong" types'best reply would be to always play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]).
16) "Weak" types playing (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) after "I" and (out; 2 [0; 1]) after "N" is not an equilibrium with conditioning, as the "strong" types'best reply would be to always play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]). 17) When "weak" types play (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) after observing "I" and (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) after "N", this is not an equilibrium with conditioning, as the "strong" types' best response would be to always play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]).
18) "Weak" types playing (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) after "I" and (out; 2 [0; 1]) after "N" is not an equilibrium with conditioning, as the "strong" types'best reply would be to always play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]).
19) For "weak" types playing (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) after observing "I" and (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) after "N" the best reply of "strong" types would be to either always play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) or to play (enter, defect; 2 [0; 1]) after observing "I" and (enter, cooperate; 2 [0; 1]) after "N", according to the parameter values. In either case "weak" types would be better o¤ deviating after observing "I".
Computing the probability of the next period' s match being informed about the defection:
For intra-group defection, the overall probability q S of the next match being informed is given by equation (A.1).
where, P (S)=Probability of meeting a player belonging to the same group, P (k j S)=Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from the same group, P (D)=Probability of meeting a player belonging to another group, P (k j D)=Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from another group.
By de…nition, the probability of a match in the next period with a player from one's own group is: P (S) = d i , whereas d i =the part of the time a given player spends with people from her own group (0 d i 1). Accordingly, the probability of matching with someone outside the group becomes P (D) = (1 d i ) .
Further, we have
where, k=part of uninformed players who become informed about the defection ("friends"), w=size of the own group relative to the whole population (0 w 1).
Introducing (A.2) and (A.3), together with P (S) = d i , and P (D) = (1 d i ), in (A.1), we obtain:
For inter-group defection, the overall probability, q D , of the next match being informed is again given by equation (A.1). As before, the likelihood of matching with a player of one's own group equals P (S) = d (for convenience, it is assumed that for the case of inter-group interaction
. The probability of matching in a given period with someone of the group of last period's betrayed opponent is P (D) = (1 d). The conditional probabilities P (k j S) and P (k j D) become as displayed in equations (A.5) and (A.6).
Introducing P (S), P (D), (A.5), and (A.6) in (A.1), we obtain (A.7).
Proof of Proposition 2: Equation (8) implies that a higher probability of the next match being informed, q, reduces the incentives for defection. It follows that intra-group tensions are lower than inter-group tensions if q S > q D . We have
. Proposition 2 is valid if condition (A.8) holds.
This is the case when the usual assumption d > max fw; 1 wg holds (it implies that d > w and d > 0:5).
Intra-group tensions are lower than social tensions in homogenous societies, if q S > q. We have q = k and q S = k
i > k, we obtain after reformulation condition (A.9), which always holds.
Inter-group tensions are greater than tensions in a homogenous society, if condition (A.10) holds.
This condition holds if ((d + w) 1)(d w) > 0, which is the case for the usual assumption d > max fw; 1 wg.
Computing q D for n-groups: For inter-group defection, the overall probability, q D , of the next match being informed is given by equation (A.11).
where, P (S)=Probability of meeting a player belonging to the same group, P (k j S)=Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from the same group, P (C)=Probability of meeting a player belonging to the group of the present opponent, P (k j C)=Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from the group of the present opponent, P (T )=Probability of meeting a player belonging to some third group, P (k j T )=Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from some third group.
As before, the likelihood of matching with a player of one's own group equals P (S) = d. The probability of matching in a given period with someone of the group of last period's betrayed opponent is P (C) = (1 d) 1 r 1 , where r=number of groups. Further, P (T ) = (1 d) r 2 r 1 . The conditional probabilities are as follows:
Introducing P (S), P (C), P (T ); (A.12), and (A.13) in (A.11), we obtain (A.14).
Appendix B -Derivations for the extent of intra-group interaction depending on group sizes
In the present appendix the computations of sections 4 and 5 are performed for the case where the part of time spent for intra-group interaction is not constant, but depends on the group size. The results of sections 4 and 5 are robust to this extension.
It is at present assumed that the players spend some …xed amount of time on intra-group (d i ) and inter-group (e i ) interaction, and that another part of their time is attributed to intra-or inter-group interaction depending on the relative group sizes. As before, we will …rst focus on the 2-group case. The new probabilities P(S) and P(D) are displayed below. where w=relative size of the player's own group relative to the whole population (0 w 1).
As previously, it holds that P (S) = 1 P (D). Since players tend to spend more time with other players belonging to their own group, it is assumed that d i e i and that P (S) > w, which is the case for small or intermediate values of w and for the condition d i e i being ful…lled.
Computing the probability of the next period' s match being informed of the defection:
As before, for intra-group defection, the overall probability q S of the next match being informed is given by equation (A.1).
Given (B.1) and (B.2), the conditional probabilities become:
where k=percentage of uninformed players who become informed about the defection ("friends"). i . 23 The formula of q S and q D , expressed in terms of D are exactly equivalent to the formula of (9) and (10) expressed in terms of d. Thus, the results of proposition 2 also hold for the new speci…cation.
Polarisation:
For assessing the impact of changes in polarisation on intra-group defection, we have to take the …rst derivative of q S with respect to w. This derivative is negative, as before in the main text, if e is relatively small, and w not too large. That is the case for small and intermediate values of w and if our initial assumption of people spending a more than proportional part of their time on intra-group interaction holds (i.e. d i e i ). Thus, as before our model predicts that more polarisation leads to more (less) intra-group tensions inside the group that sees its population share increase (decrease).
As in the main text, we set for simplicity for the analysis of inter-group interaction always d i = d j d, e i = e j e. As before, the derivative is positive for w>0.5 and negative for w<0.5, indicating that increases in polarisation (making the population shares of the two groups more equal) result in more tensions.
Segregation:
In the model of the main text we had P (S) = d i , and more segregation simply corresponded to an increase in d i . At present, P (S) = d i + (1 d i e i )w, and again increased segregation is represented by a greater (…xed) part of time spent on intra-group interaction, d i . The impact of segregation on intra-group tensions is displayed below in equation (B.11). We obtain a negative derivative, as in the main text, if d e.
Comparative statics of q S for n-groups:
The analysis of segregation in a n-group framework is identical to a twogroup framework, as the relevant equations are congruent for w = Comparative statics of q D for n-groups: As before, for inter-group defection, the overall probability, q D , of the next match being informed is given by equation (A.11). The impact of changes in segregation is analysed below:
As in the main text, we have @q D @d < 0 for d > e and at least two groups, i.e. r 2.
For assessing the impact of fractionalisation on inter-group tensions we take the …rst derivative of q D with respect to r. The derivative @q D @r becomes negative for d > e and at least two groups, i.e. r 2, which corresponds to the result in the main text.
